BRADY vs. TODD.
RECENT ENGLISH

CASES.

In the Court of Oommon Bench..
BRADY VS. TODD.

1. Mfaster and servant-Warranty on stle, of horse by servant without authority
of master-Principal and agent.
2. The servant of a private person, entrusted to sell and deliver a horse, cannot
bind his master by an unauthorized warranty.
3. Secus, in the case of the servant of a horse-dealer or livery-stable keeper whose
business is to deal in horses.

This was an action on the warranty of a horse to recover the
difference between the amount paid for the horse by the plaintiff
and that which the horse brought on sale by tha plaintiff. The
defendant by his plea traversed the warranty. The cause was tried
before Cockburn, C. J., Maidstone summer assizes, and a verdict
found for the plaintiff.
It appeared at the trial that the defendant is a potato salesman,
living in Bermondsey, and keeping a farm, eight miles distant from
London. He bought a horse in Bermondsey, and sent it down to
his farm, without any view of a sale. A veterinary surgeon, who had
received instructions from plaintiff to buy a horse, seeing the horse
at the farm, offered to one Gregg, who was defendant's bailiff on the
farm, to sell the horse, which Gregg refused to do, on the ground of
want of authority. Thereupon the veterinary surgeon went to
plaintiff, and they both subsequently spoke to Gregg about the sale
of the horse. Gregg communicated the plaintiff's wish to defendant,
Gregg
-who said, "I will not take less than 30 guineas for him."
subsequently sold the horse to plaintiff for 30 guineas, and gave,
as alleged, a warranty that the animal was sound and quiet in harness. The plaintiff finding that the horse was a kicker, called on
defendant to take him back; the defendant refused, upon which
plaintiff sold the horse at Aldridge's Repository for 15 guineas, and
sued defendant for the difference.
A rule niei having been obtained in Michaelmas Term, calling on
the plaintiff to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside,
and a verdict entered for the defendant on the plea denying the
warranty, the bailiff, Gregg, having no authority from defendant to
give a warranty.
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Hawkins, Q. C., and Barnard,now showed cause. They admitted that the point was entirely new; but contended that there were
in various cases dicta expressed obiter by the judges, that a warranty by a servant might be binding upon the master. They cited
Helyear vs. Hawke, 5 Esp. 72; Alexander vs. Gibson, 2 Camp.
555; Hern vs. Niclholl, 1 Salk. 288; Uornfoot vs. .Fowlhe, 6 M. & W.
358; Dingle vs. Hare, 29 L. J. 143, C. P. ; Bac. Abr. tit. "Master
and Servant," K.; Fenn vs. Harrison, 8 T. R. 757.
M. Chambers and G. Denman, in support of the rule, contended
that, as Gregg was not the servant of a horse-dealer or livery-stable
keeper, but a mere farm bailiff, there could not be in him an implied
authority to warrant, and it was admitted he had no express authority from the defendant to warrant the horse. The case in Espinasse,
lHelyear vs. Hawke, relied on by the other side, is not reliable, (for
the reports have not a high class reputation,) and cannot be taken
as an authority. They cited The Governor and Company of the
Bank of Scotland vs. Watson, 1 Dow. 40 and 45, per Lord Eldon;
Coleman vs. Riches, 16 0. B. 104; Story on Agency, sect. 138;
Hern vs. Nicholl, 1 Salk. 288; Smith's Law of Master and Servant,
104, 157, and 161; Southern vs. Howe, Cro. Jac. 471; Langhorne
vs. Allnutt, 4 Taunt. 519; Bolden vs. Campbell, 6 Ex. 889; M. S.
case, cited in Whitehead vs. Tucker, 15 East. 406; Chitty on Contracts, 4th ed. 208; Smith's Mercantile Law, 4th ed. 121; Story
on Agency, sect. 59, in notis.
utr. adv. vult.

February 25.-WILLIAMS, J., now delivered judgment.-In this
judgment my Lord Chief Justice, my brother Keating, and myself
agree, and my brother Willes agrees, so far as he heard the argument,
he not having heard the whole of it. Upon this rule to set aside
the verdict for the plaintiff, and enter it for the defendant, on the
plea denying the warranty of a horse, the question has been whether
the warranty by the defendant was proved. The jury have found
that Gregg, in selling the horse for the defendant, warranted it to
be sound and quiet in harness. The defendant has stated-and it
must, on this motion, be taken to be true-that he did not give
authority to Gregg to give any such warranty. The relevant facts
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are, that the plaintiff applied to the defendant, who is not a horsedealer, but a tradesman with a farm, to sell a horse; that the defendant sent his farm bailiff, Gregg, with the horse to the plaintiff,
and authorized him to sell it for 30 guineas. The plaintiff contends
that authority to an agent to sell a horse imports an authority to
him to warrant. The subject has been frequently mentioned by
judges and text writers, but we cannot find that the point has ever
been decided. It is therefore necessary to consider it on principle.
The general rule that the act of an agent does not bind his principal,
unless within the authority given to him, is clear. But the plaintiff contended that the circumstances created an authority in the
agent to warrant, on various grounds; and, amongst others, he
referred to cases where an agent has, by law, a general authority to
bind his principal, though as between themselves there is no authority
such as partners, masters of ships, and members of trading businesses
would have. Stress was laid on the decisions of several judges, that
a servant of a horse-dealer or a livery-stable keeper can bind his
master by a warranty, though as between themselves there was no
order to warrant: 1Helyear vs. Hawce, 5 Esp. 72; Alexander vs.
Gibson, 2 Camp. 555; Fenn vs. Harrison,3 T. R. 757. We understand all the judges to refer to a general agent for the purpose of
carrying on the business, that is, the business of a horse-dealer, in
which case there would be by law the authority here contended for.
But the facts of the present case do not bring the" defendant within
this rule, as he was not shown to carry on any trade or dealing in
horses. It has been also contended that a special agent, without
any express authority in fact, yet had an authority by law to bind
his principal. Where the principal has held out that the agent has
such authority, and induces the party to deal with him on the faith
that it is so, in such a case the principal is concluded from denying
the authority as against the party who believed what was held out
and acted on it: see Bolden vs. Campbell, ubi supra. But the facts
do not bring the defendant within this rule. The main reliance was
placed on the argument that an authority to sell, is by implication
an authority to do all that in the usual course of dealing is required
to complete the sale, and that the question of warranty is in the
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usual course of sale required to be answered; and, therefore, the
defendant, by implication, gave Gregg an authority to answer that
question, and bind him by his answer. It was a part of this argument, that an agent authorized to sell and deliver a horse is held out
to the buyer as having authority to warrant; but on this point, also,
the plaintiff has, in our judgment, failed. We are aware that the
question of warranty frequently arises upon the sale of horses ; we
are also aware that sales may be made without any warranty, or
even inquiring for a warranty. If we lay down for the first time
that the servant of a private owner entrusted to sell and deliver a
horse on a particular occasion is thereby to be deemed by law to
be authorized to bind his master by a warranty, we should establish
a precedent of dangerous consequence; for the liability created by
a warranty, extending to unknown as well as to known defects, is
greater than is expected by persons inexperienced in law; and as
everything said by the seller in the bargain may be evidence of
warranty to the effect of what he said, an unguarded conversation
with an illiterate man sent to deliver a horse may be found to have
created a liability which would be a surprise equally to the servant
and the master. We hold, therefore, that the buyer, taking the
warranty of such an agent as was employed in this case, takes it at
the risk of being able to show that he had the principal's authority,
and where he had not any in fact, the law, from circumstances, does
not in our opinion create it. When the facts raise the question it
will be time enough to'decide the liability created by such a servant
as the foreman authorized as a general agent ov a special agent.
A person entrusted with the sale of a horse at a fair or other public
mart, where stranger meets stranger, and the usual course of business is for the person in possession of the horse, and appearing to
be the owner, to have all the powers of such owner in respect of the
sale, the authority to sell may, under such circumstances as last
referred to, be implied, though the circumstances in the present case
do not create the same inference. It is unnecessary to add that if
the seller should repudiate the warranty made by the agent, the
sale would be void. That was not the question raised in this case.
Rule absolute.
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HORNE vs. ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN INSURANCE COMPANY.

HORNE

In

Vice Chancellor Wood's Court.

vs.

ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN

INSURANCE

COMPANY.

Where there is no provision in a policy upon the life of the assured, that it should
be void if the party whose life was insured should die by his own hands, &c.,
the Court will not declare such policy void if the party assured commits suicide.

A policy for X300 upon the life 'of a Mr. Horne had been
effected by himself in the office of the British Provident Insurance
Company, which had been amalgamated with the Anglo-Australian
Insurance Company, of which company Mr. Horne had been a
director.
No provision was contained in the policy that in case the assured
should die by duelling, or by his own hands, or the hands of justice,
it should become void.
Mr. Horne committed suicide in November, 1857, and the effect
of the verdict of the coroner's jury was, that he had destroyed
himself whilst in a state of mental derangement.
A bill was subsequently filed by his personal representative, to
have an account taken between Mr. Horne and the Anglo-Australian Company of all the dealings and transactions between them.
Another policy had been effected by Mr. Horne on his own life,
which did contain the proviso against duelling, &c.
It appeared by the bill that Mr. Horne had from time to time
advanced money upon loan to the Anglo-Australian Company, and
that various sums were at the time of his death due to him from
the company for interest on these loans, for his salary as director,
&c.
The principal question turned upori the point, whether the firstmentioned policy had become void on the grounds of general public
policy, it not containing any provision against suicide, &c., as above
mentioned.
. willeocl, Q.C. and Jollffe for the plaintiffs, the representatives
of Mr. Horne.
Sir E1. Cairns, Q.C. and Shebbeare for the Anglo-Australian
Company.
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Cole for the British Provident Company, who had repudiated the
amalgamation with the Anglo-Australian Company.
The principal cases cited were: Dufaur vs. The Professional
Life Assurance Company, 25 Beav. 602; Borradaile vs. Hunter,
5 Man. & Gr. 640; V se vs. Wakefield, 6 Mee. & W. 442: lMoore
vs. Woolsey, 4 Ell. & B. 243; Pritchard vs. llerchants' and
Tradesmen's Life Assurance Company, 27 L. J. 169, 0. P.;
Wainwright vs. Bland, 1 Moo. & Rob. 480.
The Vice-Chancellor, after stating shortly the facts of the case,
said that, as to the £300 policy, which contained no provision
against duelling, suicide, &c., he was of opinion that the death of
Mr. Horne by his own hands, while in a state of mental derangement, had not the effect of vitiating the policy. In Pauntleroy's
case, 2 Dow. & C. 1, it was held by the H. of L. that a policy was,
by necessary inference vacated, and no longer payable when the
assured had died by the hand of justice; and this on the ground
that it was against public policy that any assurance should be extended to provide against such an event, and thus afford encouragement to crime. The same argument might be urged in a case of
felo de se, where a man in a perfectly sane state committed suicide.
But no such case arose here. The deceased was found to have
been of unsound mind, and therefore had committed no legal
offence. Where there was an express contract that in the event of
suicide no payment should be made upon the policy, then the
question might arise whether suicide in a state of mental derangewent was contemplated in the exception. But this was quite distinct from considerations of public policy. Again, if the particular
event, "while in a state of insanity," had been excepted in the
policy, there would have been nothing irrational or morally unreasonable in such a contract. But, in the absence of this provision,
there was no principle of public policy to forbid payment upon a
death which arose from no crime, but from a mere accident, just as
much as if the person had faillen from a house or been drowned.
There was nothing to induce him (the Vice-Chancellor) to say that
the policy was void upon this death, which bad taken place while
the assured was in a state of mental derangement; nor was there
32

